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I. REPLY AIU;lJMENT 
A. The Respondent, Portneuf Medical Centers, LLC (PMC), is not entitled to 
attorneys fees on appeal. 
In its Statement of the Case, PMC requests attorney fees on appeal. (Respondent Br. at 8-
9.) However, PMC does not address its request for attorney fees in the argument portion of the 
Respondent Brief This Court has held that the failure to raise and address attorney fees in the 
argument portion of briefing is fatal to any request lor attorney fees. 5,'ee Bagley v. Thomason, 
149 Idaho 806, 808,241 P.3d 979, 981 (2010); Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805, 241 
P.3d 972, 978 (2010); Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497,503,927 P.2d 887,893 (1996). 
PMC has failed to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6), which requires that the argument 
portion of the brief contain the contentions of the respondent with respect to the issues presented 
on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
transcript and record relied upon." IDAHO App. R. 35(a)(6) (2012). 
PMC has failed to support its assertion with argument, authority, or analysis. As such, its 
request for attorney fees should be denied. 
B. The evidence at trial supported a finding of modification. 
Contrary to PMC's arguments, the district court had undisputed evidence before it 
pertaining to the modification of the Ground Lease. PMC misunderstands Quail Ridge's 
position. The district cOUli erred when it ruled that the parties had not modified paragraph 1.3(b) 
of the Ground Lease in 2001. 
PMC attempts to force all responsibility for the changes between the 1996 and 2001 
estoppel certificates on Faulkner. PMC's efforts to avoid responsibility for IRe's voluntary and 
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conduct 2001 documents are unsupported evidence. 
Quail Ridge did not "slip" changes to the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certiticate into 
the transaction without IHes fhll knowledge and consent Faulkner never engaged in any form 
or subterfuge or deceit when he negotiated with IHC over the contents of the 2001 transaction. 
The negotiations were open and transparent. In fact, the evidence before the district court 
established that there was a significant exchange of ideas and changes by the parties to the 2001 
transaction. (See, e.g., R Vol. II, p. 291; Trial T1'. Vol. II, 164:8-23; Der Ex. 228). The parties 
clearly negotiated over the terms, addressed issues of concern and redlined proposed documents. 
The 2001 transaction was an "arm's-length" transaction. There is nothing in the record to 
support PMC's oblique aspersions and suggestions that changes to the 2001 Landlord Consent 
and Estoppel Certificate was accomplished by deceit or any other underhanded tactics. 
The Court should keep in mind that multiple parties reviewed the 2001 transaction 
documents. IHC and Quail Ridge were not the sole parties to the transaction. Sterling 
Development was involved as well as PERSI. Ultimately, all of the parties to the 2001 
transaction signed the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate, including Everett 
Goodwin, IHC's Senior Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer. (See Def. Ex. 228.) Quail 
Ridge did not create the document in a vacuum without IHC and others having a chance to 
review it. Thus, what Faulkner did or did not do during negotiations over the substance of the 
document is beside the point. The point is that all of the parties removed key language from the 
1996 iteration of the estoppel certificate in 2001. The evidence also established that IHC 
assented to the updated form of the estoppel certificate because IHC had its attorney negotiate 
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and then had its authorized the 200 I Landlord 
Consent and l:stoppel Certificate. 
II signature is signiJicant. The signature is evidence of mutual assent to the 
modification. Mutual consent is necessary for a modification to exist. Walkins Co .. LLC v. 
5-,'forms, 272 P.3d 503, 508 (Idaho 2(12). The district court erred by limiting its consideration of 
the evidence to Faulkner's conduct as opposed to all of the facts that the parties presented during 
trial. The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certitlcate contains telms that are materially 
different than those contained in the Ground Lease Agreement and the 1996 version ofthe 
estoppel certificate. The 2001 transaction substantially changed and updated the parties' 
relationships. Whereas the Ground Lease Agreement and the 1996 estoppel certificate both 
contemplate the adjustment of rent pursuant to Section 1.3(b), the 2001 Landlord Consent and 
Estoppel Certificate clearly represents that rent is the fixed amount of $9,562.50. (See PI. Ex. 
101; Def. Ex. 228.) The 2001 document is materially different than all prior transactional 
documents executed by the parties and their predecessors. 
Quail Ridge recognizes the language contained in paragraph 2 of the 2001 document 
However, paragraph 2 must be placed in the proper context of an estoppel certificate. As noted 
in prior briefing, estoppel certificates are designed to make binding representations concerning 
the facts relevant to a real estate transaction. Lakeview Mgmt., Inc. v. Care Realty, LLC, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28171, *54 (March 30, 20(9). The representation that the Lease is in full force 
and effect merely represented that the Lease existed and was still the operative document at the 
time the parties executed the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. Paragraph 2 is 
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not a statement that the was not modified or altered in the 2001 transaction. The 
representation in the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate merely represented to all 
of the patties that the Ground Lease had not been superseded by any extant document at the time 
the parties consummated the 2001 transaction. The 2001 transaction made changes that did not 
previously exist. For example, as a part of the 2001 transaction, Forrest Preston signed a 
personal guarantee. The personal guarantee had never existed before and was new to the 2001 
transaction. (See Trial Tr. Vol. n, 164:22-23.) The district court, and subsequently PMC in its 
briefing, have entirely mispereeived and misapplied the law of estoppel certificates to the 
contents of paragraph There is no evidence that the district COUlt considered this information 
that was present in the record during trial. Therefore, the district comt en-ed. 
PMC also argues that the following language de teats Quail Ridge's arguments for 
modification: 
Landlord's consent to the assignment and assumption and/or to the sublease as set forth 
herein shall not constitute or be construed as (a) an acknowledgement of or consent to 
any other assignment, assumption, and/or sublease, (b) a waiver or modification by 
Landlord of the Tenant's duties or obligations under the Lease, or excuse Tenant's 
performance of any term or condition of the Lease, and/or (c) a waiver or moditication by 
Landlord of any of its rights under the Lease, including without limitation Landlord's 
rights pursuant to Section 12.1 of the Lease. 
(Def. Ex. 228.) The foregoing language does not apply to the estoppel certificate. It applies to 
the assigmnent and assumption documentation that the parties executed in 2001. There is 
nothing in the estoppel certificate that precludes the representations made in the certificate from 
(a) differing, altering, or amending the Ground Lease and (b) binding IHC/PMC. The document 
that the language applies to is entitled "Sale and Assumption Agreement and Agreement for 
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Substitution or was submitted as 103 I f the district 
court were limited to deciding whether the and Assumption Agreement and Agreement t()r 
Substitution of Liability document constituted a modification then PMC's argument could be 
considered. 
The 200 I Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certi tic ate is a separate, legal document 
executed concurrent with the Sale and Assumption Agreement and Agreement for Substitution of 
Liability. The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate's provisions as to rent have a 
separate legal effect as noted in Lakeview Management and other authority peliaining to the 
effects of estoppel certificates. Nothing in the estoppel celiifieate prevents its own terms from 
modifying the Ground Lease Agreement. 
PMC also takes issue with the fact that the modification occurred by removing language 
from a prior estoppel certificate. PMC, however, fails to point out any legal basis for rejecting 
"modification by subtraction." There is no legal precedence supporting PMC's implication that 
this is somehow legally improper. The term "modification" merely means introducing or 
cancelling terms. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1155 (4th Ed. 1968). A perfectly acceptable way 
to cancel terms is by removing them altogether from a legally binding document or instmment. 
PMC suggests that it would have been easier for the pmiies to modify the document 
through a different legal mechanism. PMC's arguments are impertinent. What the parties could 
or could not have done is not relevant to what the parties actually did in the 2001 transaction. 
PMC also glosses over the fact that a paucity of evidence existed suggesting that the parties 
intended anything other than to fix the rent at $9,562.50 in the 2001 Landlord Consent and 
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Estoppel 
The parties mutually agreed to the modification in the 2001 Landlord Consent and 
Estoppel Certificate. IHC represented to all of the parties in the 2001 transaction that the rent 
was going to be fixed at a set amount and that it would not be altered in the future. The 2001 
representation by I HC is difterent than its representation in 1996. There is no question that the 
representations made in the certificate should bind PMC The document should have legal 
significance and the district court erred by failing to find modification. The district court 
misapplied the law to the facts before it by ignoring the document's language and terms. The 
evidence does not support the district court's findings and it should be reversed. 
C. The district court erred by failing to find waiver. 
PMC's arguments about waiver fail. Acquiescence to a course of conduct contrary to the 
rights and obligations of a party can waive those rights. In this case, IHC manifested its intent to 
waive the rent adjustment provision ofthe Ground Lease when it signed the 2001 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Celtificate. Signing the document constituted a clear and unequivocal act 
manifesting intent to waive. This was equivalent to estoppel. Waiver or estoppel is the entire 
essence of the estoppel celtificate. The 2001 estoppel certificate constitutes a binding, 
unequivocal act that waives all prior rights except those contained in the estoppel certificate. See 
Plaza Freeway Ltd. P 'ship v. First Mountain Bank, 81 Cal. App. 4th 616, 626, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 
865, 872 (2000). 
D. The district court erred by not applying estoppel to bar PMC's claim. 
The district court erred by not estopping PMC from claiming adjusted rent because the 
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1 Landlord nne'."'\! and Estoppel makes binding representations for PMC. In its 
PMC with the legal principles and authority cited by Quail Ridge (Appellant Br. 
at 14-15) but tries to distinguish the authority. (Respondent Br. at 22.) PMC's efforts fail. 
The district court erred by not holding PMC to the contents of paragraph 5 oCthe 2001 
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. (ld.) That language provides the rent amount under 
the Ground Lease. (ld.) As noted, supra, PMC's arguments that the document "is not intended 
to modify the 1983 Lease Agreement" are incorrect and misread the document. Nothing in the 
2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certiticate precludes the parties from modifying the 
Ground Lease. Moreover, nothing in the document prevents its representations from binding 
PMC to its plain language. See, e.g, K:')' Merch. Mart, Inc. v, Northgate Ltd. P :r;hip, 835 N.E.2d 
965,971 (Ill. 2005); Plaza FreeHlay Ltd. P :,>'hip v. Fin'it Mountain Bank, 81 Cal. App. 4th 616, 
626, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 865, 872 (2000). 
As noted previously, IHe represented to Quail Ridge, Sterling Development, Pocatello 
Medical Investors (PMI), and PERSI that the rent due under the Ground Lease was $9,562.50 per 
annum. (Def. Ex. 228, ~ 5.) The 2001 representations are fundamentally different than the 1996 
representations. (ld.; see also Def. Ex. 211.) The district court never explained why, or how, it 
could justify failing to give effect to the estoppel celiificate. PMC never should have been 
allowed to assert its claim for declaratory relief because it had, through extensive arms length 
negotiations, expressly agreed to forego representations to the contrary. 
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The district court erred by disregarding the Ground Lease's hmguage. 
PMC's arguments essentially concede that the district court f~liled to apply the contract's 
language and that the district court's findings are not an interpretation of the Ground Lease but 
rather constitute a new contract 1~lshioned by the district court. The district court lacks the powcr 
to rewrite the contract and to disregard the contract's language when interpreting the document. 
When a district court is tasked with interpreting an ambiguous contract, it should actually 
interpret the subject language rather than disregarding or ignoring the language, or rewriting the 
contract altogether. S'ee Po/tach Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlach Sch. Dis!. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 
226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010) (when interpreting a eontract the court starts with the contract 
language). Quail Ridge understands the district court's actions in this case; however, those 
actions are not ret1ective of what the district court had been asked to do in the case and deviated 
from established preeedent of contract interpretation. The district court should have sought to 
effectuate the parties' intent as set forth in the actual agreement. As noted in prior briefing, "[t]o 
determine the intent of the parties, the contract must be viewed as a whole and in its entirety." 
[d. 
When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language. In the 
absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper 
sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording ofthe instrument. 
Interpreting an unambiguous contract and determining whether there has been a violation 
ofthat contract is an issue oflaw subject to free review. A contract tern1 is ambiguous 
when there are two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical. 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, but interpreting an ambiguous term 
is an issue of fact. 
Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 454-55, 259 P.3d 595, 600-01 (2011). PMC seems 
to imply that when a court is faced with ambiguous contract language that it must have extrinsic 
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in order to that ambiguous This is not the case. Even here where 
there was a small amount of extrinsic evidence about the meaning of the "taking into account" 
language, the district court still had the contract language before it and should have interpreted it 
rather than disregarding the language in its entirety. (S'ee R Vol. I, p. 195.) Ignoring the 
contract's language forms a new agreement and does not enforce the parties' intent. 
PMC's arguments about the relatively small amount of extrinsic evidence exhibit the 
same tlaws as the district court. The district court reasoned that since no parole evidence was 
admitted during trial about the terms it found ambiguous that it could not interpret the contract as 
written. The ambiguity in the paragraph 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease has nothing to do with how 
the paliies reached the $15,000.00 amount. (PI. Ex. 101.) PMC ignores the fact that the 
ambiguous language has little to do with how the parties reached that number when adjusting 
subsequent rent values. Instead, the $15,000 value should have been considered, factored in, or 
taken into account when the district court reached its decision in this case. (Id.) The district 
court, by its own admission, did not take the language into account in reaching its findings. 
Therefore, the district court erred. 
Quail Ridge's arguments do not "elevate the guidelines" to an inappropriate level. Quail 
Ridge seeks only to have the contract language actually considered rather than ignored. Quail 
Ridge's position is consistent with the law governing contract interpretation, i.e., that the cOUli 
actually interpret the contract language and not ignore it. Potlach Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlach Sch. 
Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010). It is only by parsing the 
contract language, and ignoring the ambiguous terms, that the district court could have reached 
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the that it did this case. The district court failed 10 take into aceollnt the very tenus that 
it should have been considering, taking into account the parties' original agreement that the 
initial minimum rent was the 1 S<Yo of a fair market value of $15,000/acre and the subsequent 
determinations or acquiescence to values for prior adjustment periods. (PI. Ex. 101.) The 
district court erroneously applied the law because it failed to consider the relevant facts. Fux v. 
A4011nfain W Elrc .. Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 706-07, 52 P.3d 848, 851-52 (2002). The district COllli 
should be reversed. 
PMC also misunderstands Quail Ridge's position regarding adjustment. The Ground 
Lease does not require that rent only be increased. (PI. Ex. 101.) Instead, the document provides 
for an adjustment orrent. (Id.) This adjustment could be an increase or a decrease. 
The time period tor adjustment that is the subject of this appeal is the time period 
between 2007 and 2010. The evidence is undisputed that the land values in the Pocatello area 
decreased from 2007 to 2010. (Trial T1'. Vol. I, 62:11-65:2; Vol. II, 202:2-7.) In tact, PMC's 
own expert, Brad Janoush, testitied that the decrease in was -8.33%. (Id. Vol. I, 64:11-18.) The 
Ground Lease does not require an objective market based approach to the rent adjustment. (PI. 
Ex. 101.) Instead, the Ground Lease requires that the subsequent rent adjustments take into 
account (1) the original value assigned by the parties and (2) any subsequent adjustments by the 
parties. (ld.) There is no dispute that the parties never adjusted rent for over 27 years. The 
parties all agreed, acquiesced, or otherwise conceded for the majority of the life ofthe Ground 
Lease that the rent would remain static. The district court should have taken that course of 
conduct into account when it decided this case. The findings and conclusions, however, 
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that it did not do so. the contract the district 
court, the rent should been adjusted as a Ii,,,·,,,,,,.) in favor of Quail 
l'he district court did not follow the law of contract interpretation and construction. Even 
under the "priorities" identified by PMC in Section of the Restatement (Second) Contracts 
(1981), establish that the district court failed to properly apply the law. First, Quail Ridge's 
interpretation offhe contract language is proper because it considers all of the language 
contained in the Ground Lease and does not ignore key terms. Based on Restatement Section 
203, an interpretation that gives effect to all terms is preferred to one that "leaves a part 
unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 203(a). The 
district co1ll1's interpretation left terms having no eflect. Quail Ridge's interpretation also 
considers the express terms of the contract and factors in the course of performance. See id. § 
203(b). This interpretation considers the fact that the parties never adjusted rent over 27 years of 
dealing and also factors in the ambiguous language that the district court should be interpreted in 
this case. The third priority also supports Quail Ridge's position. The taking into account 
language in l.3(b) is not "general language" as PMC suggests. It is just as integral to the rent 
adjustment process as any of the other tenns. In fact, one might argue that "taking into account" 
is the most specific language in the section because it adds unique layers to the rent adjustment 
calculus. Regardless, and contrary to PMC's assertions, the "prime directive" of Section 1.3(b) 
of the Ground Lease is adjusting rent as follows: 
a. Based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date 
without taking the leasehold into account; 
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b. into account the the initial minimum rent is the above-stated 
percentage applied to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars 
($15.000.00) per acre; and, 
c. Take into account any determinations ot'market value made under this lease for the 
purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent adjustment date. I 
(PI. Ex. 101.) Eaeh factor identitied in the Ground Lease is of equal weight and are of mutual 
importance. PMC lacks any legal basis for arguing to the contrary. 
PMC makes a mystifying and specious argument that the "taking into account" language 
is precatory. PMC's argument makes no sense and relies on isolating the three words from the 
entire context of paragraph 1.3(b). The relevant portion of 1.3(b) reads: 
The rent adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) percent (sic) of the fair market 
value of the leased land, exclusive of improvements on the premises. Determination of 
fair market value shall be based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable 
rent adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account. The determination shall 
take into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated 
percentage applied to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars 
($15,000.00) per acre and shall also take into account any determinations of market value 
made under this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable 
rent adjustment date. 
(Id., emphasis added). The taking into account language is not just a useful suggestion or helpful 
tip for the parties. The language is mandatory because it is preceded by the word "shall". The 
word "shall" is defined "as used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally 
1 The mandatory directive that they "shall" be considered when adjusting rent precedes each of the foregoing 
elements of the rent adjustment process. This is important given PMC's argument that the taking into account 
language is precatory. 
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or BLACK \; LA W I (4th 1(68). 
preceded by "shall" are anything but precatory. 
F. The district court erred by not finding a course of dealing. 
Inaction is a type 0 f course of dealing. The parties and their predecessors all chose not to 
adjust the rent for a variety of reasons, some known and some unknown. The district court had 
before it information that showed a conscious decision by IHe to not adjust the rent. Those 
choices are relevant to course of dealing. There is also no dispute that following the 200 1 
transaction that PMC failed to adjust the rent once it stepped into IlIC's shoes. The district court 
flliled to take the course of dealing by the parties into account when it reached its decision. This 
was an error by the district court and its decision should be reversed and remanded. 
G. The district court erred by admitting Brad Janoush's testimony. 
There should be no dispute over whether Janoush ever reviewed the substance of the 
Ground Lease. He never reviewed the document prior to his appraisal. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, 63: lO-
15.) PMC does not even argue that Janoush considered the Ground Lease's tenns when coming 
up with his value for the property. This was improper because the fair market value was never to 
be based solely on an objective appraisal of the property. Janoush's methodology was 
irredeemably Hawed and the district court erred by admitting Janoush's testimony and then by 
relying on the testimony when the district court fashioned its remedy. 
Since Janoush was the sole source of evidence for the district court when it calculated the 
adjusted rent, the Amended Declaratory Judgment should be vacated, Janoush's testimony 
stricken fiom the record, and the district court reversed. 
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n. CONCLUSION ANI) RELIEF REQUESTED 
a result of the foregoing, the district court should be reversed and remanded . 
. Gat1i1ey 
John Avondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gath1ey PA 
Attorneys t()r the Defendant/Appellant 
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